Blog Archives

Machine Learning, the usual Bat and deflationary epistemology

Posted on September 9, 2017 by Sergio Graziosi — 4 Comments

This is a quick, semi-serious follow-up to my first Twitter poll. In a rare moment of impulsivity, I’ve recently posted a deliberately awkward question on twitter. A few respondents did notice that something was amiss, an indeed, an explanation is…

Tagged with: Artificial Intelligence, consciousness, Machine Learning, Phenomenal Experience, Twitter
Posted in Consciousness, Philosophy, Stupidity

Predictive Processing: the role of confidence and precision

Posted on May 21, 2017 by Sergio Graziosi — 5 Comments

This is the second post in a series inspired by Andy Clark’s book “Surfing Uncertainty“. In the previous post I’ve mentioned that an important concept in the Predictive Processing (PP) framework is the role of confidence. Confidence (in a prediction)…

Against epiphenomenalism: summary and reply.

Posted on February 28, 2016 by Sergio Graziosi — 15 Comments

What follows is a direct reaction to the discussion I’ve had with Jochen below my first epiphenomenalism post. The discussion meandered into scary places, and Jochen ended up recommending me to keep it simple instead. I’m sure it is a…

Tagged with: Brian D Earp, Epiphenomenalism, Phenomenal Experience, Philosophical Zombie, Zombie
Posted in Consciousness, Philosophy, Stupidity

Sources of Error: Epiphenomenalism (part 2)

Posted on January 16, 2016 by Sergio Graziosi — 23 Comments

Epiphenomena haunt me: the actual idea that we can explain any phenomena with the aid of the concept is thoroughly alien to me. In turn, this means that I don’t understand why people do rely on the concept, and consequently…

Tagged with: Bailey, Epiphenomenalism, Phenomenal Experience, Philosophical Zombie, Robinson, Zombie
Posted in Consciousness, Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Stupidity

Sources of Error: Epiphenomenalism (part 1)

Posted on January 10, 2016 by Sergio Graziosi — 25 Comments

Epiphenomenalism is one idea I’ve struggled with for a long time: to my eyes, it doesn’t make any sense. But more importantly, when applied to philosophy of mind, it seems to me that epiphenomenalism does a great deal of damage.…

Tagged with: Chalmers, Epiphenomenalism, Swinburne
Posted in Consciousness, Philosophy, Premises, Psychology, Science

Evolutionary Theory of Consciousness: first reply to comments.

Posted on September 13, 2015 by Sergio Graziosi — 12 Comments

Two of my readers have kindly provided some very interesting comments and questions on my Evolutionary Theory of Consciousness paper (ETC). Because their comments and questions are very relevant and thought-provoking, I am publishing my reply as a separate post.…